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FROM CONSANGUINITY TO CONSUBSTANTIALITY 
JULIAN PITT-RIVERS! "THE KITH AND THE KIN!
Laurent Dousset 
Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales
Centre de Recherche et de Documentation sur l!Océanie, Marseille
Aix-Marseille University
Marseille, France
laurent.dousset@pacific-credo.fr
In 1973, Julian Pitt-Rivers published a chapter in Goody’s The Character of Kinship that, 
although rather infrequently used and quoted, suggested a work-around to the major 
criticisms that were expressed towards kinship studies in the 1970s.  Reintroducing the 
notion of “consubstantiality”, Pitt-Rivers suggested a bringing together of emic and etic 
approaches to kinship classification and ontology.  As straightforward as it may appear, 
the concept, when combined with Burke’s use of the notion in relation to that of “con-
text”, crystallizes a methodology for embedding structural and formal approaches of 
kinship within the social domains of relatedness and action.  While discussing Pitt-
Rivers’ proposition, this paper illustrates the application of consubstantiality as an ex-
planatory model of the extension of self in the Australian Western Desert through two 
examples: the diversity of marriage scenarios and their consequences and the “unusual” 
usage of some terminological classes in relation to close kin.  
After Needham’s and Schneider’s critiques in the 1970s evacuated kinship  as a non-
subject for anthropological research, many scholars endeavored to redefine what was 
once the pinnacle of the discipline in more emic terms.  In the attempt to depart from 
euro-centric definitions of genealogy and classification, which were previously explicitly 
or implicitly considered universal aspects of human societies, notions such as ‘related-
ness’ made their way  into the theoretical apparatus.  The advantages of such a concept 
were that it based whatever was to be analyzed on local and culture-specific modes of 
relating to others and that  it did not assume the existence of any  predefined domain of 
relationship  conception, representation or construction.  The inconvenience was, as we all 
know, the mystification of ‘culture’ in terms of incommensurable symbolic webs dis-
jointed from the notion of ‘society’ and the latter would be progressively  eliminated from 
the anthropological glossary.  Every  individual appears to have his or her own culture, or 
nearly so.  As Friedman explains, complex subjectivities and emergent socialities are now 
linked to the generalized cultural pluralism of different  identities, albeit ethnic, religious 
or territorial.  Culture is transformed from a structure of existence to a mere role set: “the 
individual can practice culture by choice, by  elective affinity, like joining the golf club 
instead of the Wahabists, at least on Monday” (Friedman 2012:239).
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In the light of this change of paradigm, some have applauded the disappearance of 
so-called anthropological meta-discourses, while others have warned that the overempha-
sis of particularized narratives was weakening the discipline’s capacity  to engage in theo-
retical interactions.  As expected, the real world is not as dichotomous as some would 
have it and in my own work I was to discover that both meta-discourse or theory and lo-
cal narratives are in fact complementary, not exclusive, methodologies.  There had to be 
ways to bridge a gap  that increasingly appeared to me to be of an ideological rather than 
an epistemological nature.  Interestingly, I found refuge in a paper that was published in 
the same period as Needham and Schneider’s critiques, but that had not, it seemed, at-
tracted the attention I now believe it  deserved.  The suggested opportunity it provided for 
combining structure and practice, or universalism and relativism, in one and the same 
analysis was probably too simple and straightforward—and therefore also powerful—for 
it to be adopted at a moment of anthropological history in which scholars were aiming at 
divorce rather than reconciliation.  What I am referring to is Julian Pitt-Rivers’ chapter 
published in Jack Goody’s The character of kinship (1973), two years after Needham’s 
Rethinking Kinship and Marriage and eleven years before Schneider’s A critique of the 
study of Kinship.1  Nelson Graburn (1977:1157), in a review of Goody’s volume, wrote 
the following paragraph: 
Julian Pitt-Rivers' paper, ‘The Kith and the Kin,’ again starts with the basically 
moral nature of kinship and the notion of amity and parallels the latter with 
Sahlins' notion of generalized reciprocity  and Schneider's idea of diffuse enduring 
solidarity.  But he identifies the symbolic fundament of kinship relationships as 
that of consubstantiality.  He then examines and classifies various types of institu-
tionalized relationships, such as adoptive and ritual kinship, friendship, and mar-
riage, in what is perhaps the most stimulating paper in the book.
Unfortunately, at this stage at least, that  is about all that was to be said about Pitt-
River’s contribution, “the most stimulating paper.” Also one, I wish to add here, that is, 
despite its potential, a neglected contribution in the realm of understanding human rela-
tionships, be it based on the axiom of ‘kinship’ or that of ‘relatedness.’2 What the concept 
of consubstantiality—the extension of the idiom of shared substance—as defined in “The 
Kith and the Kin” allows for, I argue in this article, is the reintroduction of materialist as-
pects in studying kinship through an articulation of ‘structure’, ‘substance’, ‘practice’ and 
‘context’.
After a few considerations on the notion of consubstantiality in general as derived 
from the Christian religion and in particular as applied in anthropology, I will move on to 
adapt the usage Pitt-Rivers suggested for this concept to that of consubstantiality as a 
sharing of contexts as proposed by Burke (1969a and 1969b).  I will then use a few eth-
nographic examples taken from the domain of kinship to illustrate how marriage rules, as 
opposed to marriage practices, as well as formal terminological systems as opposed to 
their contextual usages, gain from an understanding of kinship  as being part of an onto-
logical value system expressed in particular contexts.
Consubstantiality before Pitt-Rivers
2
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Consubstantiality is not, as such, an innovative notion, of course, since it is a major con-
cept in Christian theology, probably  adopted from the Egyptian tradition (Beatrice 2002). 
Homoousion (or Latin consubstantialis), as it was clarified at the Council of Nicea in the 
year AD 325, is the intrinsic nature of the Trinity and the relationship between God, his 
uncreated Son and the Holy Spirit.  In the words of the Athanasian Creed, “the Father is 
God, the Son is God, and the Holy Spirit is God, and yet there are not three Gods but one 
God.” A distinct, although related, concept is that of ‘consubstantiation’, according to 
which the body of Jesus Christ exists together with the substance of bread in the Holy 
Eucharist.  It  does not express an identity of substances in the same sense as consubstan-
tiality does, but only their parallelism or coexistence.
As is the case with many anthropological concepts, the usage of consubstantiality 
is derived from preexisting semantic histories and fields, but it also departs from them in 
significant ways in academic jargon.  There are early traces of the uses of consubstantial-
ity  as an elucidatory  mechanism in the anthropological literature (see Jones 1986).  The 
objective in much of the latter was, however, not that different from its Christian usages 
and endeavored to explain religious phenomena as embedded in consubstantial concep-
tions and perceptions: people consider themselves to be sharing some sort  of substance 
with religious forces and this sharing constitutes their essence and person.  Totemism, for 
example, was explained as a phenomenon in which consubstantiality is involved.  Lévi-
Bruhl spoke of “the mystic consubstantiality in which the individual, the ancestral being 
living again in him and the animal or plant species that forms his totem are all mingled” 
(in Bullock 1931:185, also see Frazer (1931[1929]:20 or Lang 1905).  In many cases, this 
consubstantiality between the individual and his or her totem, in particular in what is 
called ‘conception totemism’ was explained by  the postulate of ‘nescience’: the lack of 
knowledge in so-called small-scale societies, and in particular the societies of Australian 
Aborigines, about the physiological process of procreation (for example, Ashley  Montagu 
1974[1937]; see Merlan 1986 for a discussion).  The concept of consubstantiality was, in 
these contexts, simply  used to refer to the indigenous cosmogony (read ‘non-science’) 
about ontogeny and phylogeny.  Since Australian Aboriginal people do not understand the 
physiological function of sexuality, they explain reproduction as some sort of reincarna-
tion of mythic beings and essences and thus consider themselves to be consubstantial 
with them.  As one can easily understand, this usage has not evolved from a religious 
grounding of the concept and it does not address the question of relatedness as one of the 
foundations of interaction among human beings.  Pitt  Rivers’ redefinition of consubstan-
tiality, however, provides an important step forward in this respect.
From Pitt-Rivers' consubstantiality to Burke’s context
As I have already noted elsewhere (Dousset 2005), it is significant that Holy (1996:9) 
introduces his discussion of anthropological perspectives on kinship with the notion of 
consubstantiality as it was forged by Pitt-Rivers: “people see themselves as mutually re-
lated to each other because they  share a common substance and they see themselves as 
unrelated to those with whom they do not.”  While sharing substance is, in Pitt-Rivers' 
view, still somehow related to material exchanges and circulation, it is not limited to the 
3
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sole consequence of procreation: “consubstantiality can be established by other ways than 
by breeding as the example of blood brotherhood shows” (Pitt-Rivers (1973:93).  Indeed, 
suckling the same milk or eating the same food are, in many  cultures, processes that lead 
to shared substances and, therefore, to the establishment of relatedness and kinship ties 
(see for example El Guindi in this issue and Strathern 1973).  Pitt-Rivers (1973:92) de-
fined consubstantiality in these terms as “the prime nexus between individuals for the ex-
tension of self.” His proposition may appear, at least in contemporary times, to be some-
thing very ordinary.  In the 1970’s, however, and to some extent still today as we will see 
below (and provided we extend Pitt-Rivers’ idea in a new direction), to consider genea-
logical ‘consanguinity’ as simply one type of consubstantiality, which thus becomes the 
precinct of specific cultural constructs, was a major step forward.  
Of course, Morgan (1997[1871]), using the plural form in Systems of consanguin-
ity  and affinity, had already implied that consanguinity may  not be a universally applica-
ble concept without hurdles and, after Pitt-Rivers, Héritier (1981:13) wrote that “the defi-
nition of consanguinity is in the first place a question of choice and social recognition,” 
but they were not actually  able to bridge the gap  in conceptual terms.  As Cucchiari 
(1981:35) wrote:
Like Barnes and Pitt-Rivers I take a middle position between those who say 
kinship is genealogy reified and those who view kinship as a set of sociocultural 
categories that also have genealogical referents ….  Pitt-Rivers articulates this 
middle position.  Following Fortes, he views kinship as relations of ‘prescribed 
amity.’ Unlike friendship, a set of dyadic relationships, kinship is a system of rela-
tionships or categories over which rights, duties, statuses, and roles are differen-
tially  distributed and inherited.  What distinguishes kinship, as a social system, 
from other systems is its underlying notion of shared substance: 
‘consubstantiation.’3 ….  The idea of shared substance is culture specific and may 
have little or nothing to do with the concepts of physical science.
Meyer Fortes (1969:251) indeed defined ‘amity’ as a “set of normative premises 
...  focused upon a general and fundamental axiom” that he calls “the axiom of prescrip-
tive altruism.”  Pitt-Rivers (1973) understood prescriptive altruism to be the foundation 
of the notion of reciprocity, which is called into existence by the “assumption that every-
man, individually  or in solidarity with a collectivity  with which he identifies himself, 
seeks his own interest and advancement ...” (Pitt-Rivers 1973:89).4  Amity, as Pitt-Rivers 
himself explains (p. 89), “looks curious, for friendship, far from being commonly  re-
garded as the essence of kinship is usually  opposed to it.  … It  appears that Fortes has 
chosen to define the essence of kinship  by appealing to the very concept of what it is not. 
… I shall argue,” Pitt-Rivers writes again, “that it offers the possibility  of placing the no-
tion of kinship in a wider framework and of escaping from the polemics concerning its 
relationship  to physical reproduction” (p. 90).  Fortes, and with him Pitt-Rivers, seem to 
see kinship as a category of the wider domain of amity, justified, as Pitt-Rivers explains 
himself, by  the fact that “non-kin amity loves to masquerade as kinship” (p. 90), leading 
to the question “when is kinship artificial and when is it  ‘true kinship’?” (p. 91)–a truly 
4
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misleading question, I should add.  
However, Pitt-Rivers starts from what I believe to be a productive idea: that 
kinship is the extension of self and that physical reproduction, although insufficient, fur-
nishes the model (or one model) for such extensions.  I argue further that kinship is not 
only a grid of relationships, but is mainly concerned with the meanings underlying rela-
tionships.  What is extended are not the relationships as such, but their ontological value, 
since what we need to underline here is the proposition that kinship is, as Craig (1979) 
says, an ontological system, not only a system of classification.  To show how this as-
sumption has informed my own approach in the field, I need to make some detours and 
rephrase Pitt-Rivers’ consubstantiality in the light of other aspects of analysis.
Despite Pitt-Rivers’ interesting definition of consubstantiality, he did not actually 
apply  it himself.  Maybe he was concerned with the limitations ‘consubstantiality’ im-
plied as a methodological tool.  As such, it seemed to offer only  a generalization or rela-
tivization of the principles inherent in the notion of ‘consanguinity’.  To further develop 
the concept, we must link it to other notions, and in particular to those developed by 
Kenneth Burke (1969a, 1969b) who proposed an existential signification of consubstanti-
ality (see Dousset 2005).  Burke explains that while substance is used to define what a 
thing is, it derives from something that this thing is not, as the breaking down of the word 
into sub (below) and stance (stand) makes clear.  “The word, in its etymological origins 
would refer to an attribute of the thing’s context” (Burke 1969a:23).  
Transferring etymological deconstructions onto methodological considerations is 
problematic.  Let us play this mind game, nevertheless, and consider that Burke’s propo-
sition provides clues as to how an applicable understanding of consubstantiality in his 
terms takes form.  It  is an identity of things based on a common context but not necessar-
ily  on a common material substance.  If we translate this into the study of kinship, we 
may suggest that kinship is as much the actual relationship between people and the way 
these relationships are formally calculated, as the context in which they  take on a particu-
lar meaning or ontological class.  This suggestion can be related to the idea of instantia-
tion of kin terms as proposed by Read (2005:16)
Instantiation of kin terms can involve sets of persons outside of genealogical trac-
ing; e.g., adopted children, or persons inconsistent with genealogical tracing, such as 
same sex marriages in which one person is identified as the ‘wife’ and the other as the 
‘husband’.  Instantiation of kin terms is neither determined by features of genealogical 
tracing nor limited to properties that can be expressed within the conceptual structure of 
genealogical tracing.  Instead, instantiation is by cultural consensus as to who is encom-
passed within the range of a kin term when it is applied to concrete individuals.
For example, a woman does not  always have and express the same relationship to 
her mother.  It will adapt and change depending on the context in which she interacts with 
her mother: in the company  of her siblings, eating with in-laws, attending the family’s 
Christmas celebration and so on.  The context will invest the word ‘mother’ with particu-
lar meanings or ontological classes, but, conversely, the context  will also be colored by a 
normative or nearly normative consideration of the mother-daughter kin relationship. 
Thus what remains to be done, in addition to the identification of locally recognized 
5
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kinship categories, is the analysis of the ontological classes or values that are considered 
to locally produce particular contexts, or are interpreted as doing so.  
A few possible examples will be discussed below, but what we can already ad-
vance is that by  adopting the complex aspects of consubstantiality  as a vehicle for the 
construction of relatedness, we have also moved from a purely model-based approach to 
kinship towards kinship conceived as a process of interaction with others in particular 
contexts, a process that has been widely adopted by  kinship specialists (for example, Car-
sten 1995 and 2000, and formalized by Read 2007).  In my own work, one important task 
has been to reintegrate kinship into other social domains such as the political and eco-
nomic organization and the belief-system and to understand how relationships seen as a 
sharing of substances (read ‘contexts’, following Burke) create genealogy-like structures.
Ethnography
Understanding marriage patterns and practices, and even marriage rules, in terms of their 
integration in traditional as well as contemporary  economic networks of exchange and 
reciprocity in the Australian Western Desert has led me to consider promises of marriages 
as identical to marriages themselves.  There is no particular reason to distinguish the 
promise of a wife during initiation in Australia from an actual marriage when the strate-
gies in which the two processes are involved have similar if not identical aims and when 
the ontological classes of the relationships established are similar, if not identical.  Mar-
riage and initiation are contexts that produce similar ontological values.  In terms of 
kinship, they  produce identical consubstantialities.  Let us illustrate this point with some 
ethnography.
In the Australian Western desert, people have clear ideas about who should marry 
whom.  These ideas, framed explicitly as rules, are astonishingly  structural in nature. 
People should marry, so they say, a person whose father you call kamuru (mother’s 
brother) and whose mother you call kurntili (father’s sister).  Moreover, they  add, the ka-
muru in question needs to be a man’s initiator (waputju), and his wife thus becomes one’s 
yumari (mother-in-law).  Waputju is polysemic, designating both the initiator and the 
father-in-law.  This waputju promises his daughter to the young initiate during the cere-
mony and this daughter becomes kurri (wife) and is in the ceremonial context called pi-
karta (lit.  ‘the one obtained through pain’).  Additionally, so they say, one’s father initi-
ates the latter’s son and promises one’s sister to this future brother-in-law.  Moreover, the 
initiator (father-in-law) is one’s mother’s brother and one’s mother-in-law is one’s fa-
ther’s sister.  Linking discursive rules and actual practices, people suggest that all mar-
riages follow this pattern.  
The above description, which is a condensed form of the many discussions I have 
had with people from the Western Desert, could have been drawn from a textbook: mar-
riage is not a question of choice or of strategy, it is the result of an explicit compliance 
with what, since Lévi-Strauss (1967[1947]), has been called a system of direct exchange, 
something of a ‘classic’ for Dravidian types of terminologies and kin classifications. 
Moreover, it  expresses an ‘alliance of marriage’, as Dumont (1968) defined it: the repeti-
tion of structurally identical exchanges over generations.  The effect of such a system is 
6
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boundedness, because as families or family groups are intermarrying consistently over 
time, it does not allow for the extension of the social network.  This extension of the net-
work, however, is exactly what one would expect for these societies, considering their 
socio-historical context (see Dousset 2005 for a study of the large-scale networks) as well 
as the ecological harshness in which these groups still subsist today: ecological condi-
tions that imply the need for large-scale cooperation and the possibility  to access distant 
resources in moments of scarcity.  One would rather expect, for the Western Desert, what 
Keen (2002) has called ‘shifting webs’: mechanisms that enhance the diversification, 
rather than the repetition, of alliance.
Intrigued by these questions and not satisfied with the structural models expressed 
by indigenous peoples themselves only, I continued the study with a deeper analysis of 
actual practices and the collation of extensive genealogies and life histories before return-
ing to reinvestigate these rather normalized narratives.  First  of all, the genealogies, 
which go back about one century  (about fifty years before first contact with the Western 
world; see Dousset 2011), depict only very few cases that do in fact comply with some 
sort of exchange and only one case of an actual direct exchange.  Secondly, only  very few 
examples reflected a marriage with a man’s actual initiator’s daughter.  The frequency  of 
compliance with the two above-mentioned rules is below one percent of all marriages; an 
extremely strange situation considering the highly normalized tone interviewed people 
employ with respect to what they consider ‘inalterable rules’.
The usual argument advanced in the past to explain ethnographies that seemed to 
contradict the anthropological models so dear to Radcliffe-Brown, Lévi-Strauss and oth-
ers was to explain  them through the cultural breakdown experienced by Australian socie-
ties.  Lévi-Strauss’ reply (1968) to Hiatt (1968), when the latter demonstrated that the no-
tion of ‘patrilineal local clan’ was difficult to defend in the area where he worked, illus-
trates this method: Lévi-Strauss underlined that while he was not really interested in peo-
ples’ actual practices but rather in the general structures that organized their minds, in any 
case he also thought that the Gidjingali studied by Hiatt had lost their culture and could 
not be used as an example to counter well-established anthropological models.  Lévi-
Strauss would probably express a similar critique with regard to the contradictions that 
appear in the Western Desert material mentioned above and state that  the discrepancy be-
tween discourse and practice is evidence of a cultural breakdown.  Further ethnography, 
however, shows that this kind of critique is not valid.  Let us have a closer look at mar-
riage and initiation in this context.
When discussing actual life histories and marriage patterns, as opposed to mar-
riage rules and norms, Western Desert people distinguish several types of marriages 
(Dousset 1999).  Pikarta, already mentioned, is the wife promised through initiation and 
reflects the discursive, ideal-typical union: a mother’s brother acts as an initiator promis-
ing his daughter and through this becomes a father-in-law.  However, during initiation, 
another actor is relevant: pampurlpa.  She is the initiator’s classificatory  wife, never an 
actual wife.  During initiation, she also promises her own daughter to the initiate.  After 
the ceremony, the young man thus already  has two potential wives.  Let me here mention 
that polygyny is possible, but very  rare.  In fact, the young man will usually marry  an-
7
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other girl altogether, either through elopement (karlkurnu), or thanks to repetitive pre-
sents (warngirnu) to this girl's family, his future family-in-law.  Furthermore, all these 
women are called kurri (wife) and their parents are called waputju and yumari (initiator/
father-in-law and mother-in-law), whether they are actual parents-in-law or initiators or 
not.  The relationships established with these people involve obligations of care and reci-
procity identical to those established with one’s actual parents-in-law.  
Waputju thus changes, in analytical terms, from being polysemic, as mentioned 
above, to being metonymic, including the container as well as its various possible con-
tents, expressing a relationship defined by similar ontological values (read ‘contexts’) 
rather than actual genealogical relationships.  And, going even further, people consider 
marriages established through karlkurnu or warngirnu to be actual exchanges.  They  con-
sider them to be in complete compliance with the normative system mentioned earlier. 
When asked to explain what to anthropologists appears as a contradiction, they further 
add that  ‘you got to marry little bit long way’ and ‘you got to marry other places and 
other people’; that is, shifting webs.  It is not possible here to go into the particulars of 
each value system.  Let us simply note that boundedness and its apparent opposite, diver-
sification and openness—or ‘discourse’ or ‘rule’ and their apparent opposite ‘practice’—, 
are not really  in contradiction here.  They reflect two complementary enactments of one 
and the same principle: using context as a modus operandi for relationship definition and 
establishment.
To make this suggestion clear, we need to add another aspect to the analysis: ter-
minological usages.  Here, the importance of context/consubstantiality becomes explicit.5 
Australian Western Desert terminology has caused considerable problems (Tjon Sie Fat 
1998).  Following Elkin’s ethnography  (1931, 1938-40, 1940), kinship specialists such as 
Lévi-Strauss (1967[1947]) or Scheffler (1978) depicted what is often called the Aluridja 
system as being rather unconventional for Australia.6 Western Desert people do not seem 
to distinguish cross-cousins from siblings and have some sort  of Hawaiian system at 
Ego’s generation, while they do distinguish mother’s brothers from fathers and father’s 
sisters from mothers, forming a more Dravidian-like level.  The conclusions drawn were 
that Western Desert people marry people they call brother and sister.  In fact, Elkin’s eth-
nography was already problematic since he applied “the short-term survey  method” 
(Burke 2005:212), which did not enable him to understand that terminological usages in 
the Western Desert are heavily context-dependent.  Short field trips did not allow him to 
investigate those usages that apply to potential affines; that is, to geographically and 
genealogically distant persons who are, as was briefly  mentioned above, preferred in mar-
riage arrangements in a ‘shifting webs’ perspective.
The consideration of the context of terminological usages as a place for creating 
consubstantial relationships shows that there are at least two particular contexts in which 
terminological classes reflect different ontological classes (see Dousset, 2012).  One such 
context I call sociological.  It is a context in which social category systems, in particular 
alternate generational moieties that are fundamental aspects in Western Desert everyday 
life, are the reference of discussion.  Here, cross-parallel distinctions are suppressed and 
classification retains only generation and gender as componential markers.  All women of 
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generation 1 and generation -1 are called ‘mother’ and all men ‘father’.  All women of 
generation 0, 2 and -2 are called ‘sister’ and all men are called ‘brother’.  The terminol-
ogy that usually has five levels is skewed so as to produce only two Hawaiian levels.
Then there is what I call the ‘egological’ context in which individual interrelations 
are the point of reference.  Here, cross and parallel are distinguished, though not in all 
cases.  On the one hand, cross-cousins who are genealogically and geographically distant, 
and hence potential wives and husbands, are indeed called ‘cross-cousins’ or ‘wife/
husband’ as we would expect.  Co-generationals who are considered to share too much 
substance and experience (read contexts), who have grown up  together and who have 
lived in the same camp or community  are, on the other hand, classed with ‘brothers’ and 
‘sisters’ even when they are cross-cousins (also see Tonkinson 1975).
Far from being ‘aberrant’, as Lévi-Strauss (1967[1947]:231, 251 and figure 56, p. 
249) wrote with respect to the Western Desert  kinship system, we see here again, as was 
the case with marriage eluded to before, that it is not the classificatory position alone, but 
the opportunity to diversify the network and gain access to resources, in one of the harsh-
est environments ever inhabited by human beings (Gould 1969), that determines the ap-
plicable terminology.  Lévi-Strauss, of course, did not have the necessary ethnographic 
material to understand this.  But, after reading his response to Hiatt, it can also be as-
sumed that he would not have taken it into account in any case.
Conclusion
Marshall Sahlins has recently published in the Journal of the Royal Anthropological Insti-
tute (2011a and 2011b) a paper in two parts that is relevant for our discussion.  Sahlins’ 
proposition of the ‘mutuality  of being’ coincides closely, I believe, with Pitt-Rivers’ con-
substantiality as an extension of self, as long as we do indeed understand substance not as 
an identifiable material or immaterial characteristic, but as an ontological element of a 
shared context.  Mutuality of being recalls what  I have suggested should be understood as 
value systems inherent to particular contexts.  What was further suggested in this article 
was to consider kinship as being, by definition, based on consubstantiality, and, further, 
that consubstantiality  must be considered as part of a process or strategy of context-
creation.  Initiation rituals are such contexts.  Camp-proximity  and living together are 
others.  During the former, interdependence between initiator and initiate, to take just one 
example, are glued into a kin-like relationship: that between a father-in-law and a son-in-
law, with all the consequences ensuing from this relationship, such as the obligation to 
care for each other and to provide each other with access to resources.  In the latter, pro-
longed co-residence, implying co-nurture and co-experience, is thought to produce a rela-
tionship  that has identical ontological value to that between actual siblings: similarity, if 
not identity, in most aspects (except for gender) and therefore prohibition of sexual inter-
course or marriage, even though, from a classificatory point of view, it may be potentially 
permitted.  What these ontological values are in each of the particular contexts and how 
they  relate to each other, however, is something that still needs to be analyzed carefully  in 
the Western Desert and elsewhere.
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1  Let us recall, however, that  Schneider published the first  version of Kinship, Nationality and 
Religion …  in 1969 (republished in 1977), in which he already pointed out  a certain number of 
problems he took up in his 1984 critique.
2  Craig (1979) and Cucchiari (1981) are among the few that have explicitly made use of Pitt-
Rivers' contribution in their own work.
3  Note that Cucchiari uses the word ‘consubstantiation’, which creates some confusion with the 
Christian Eucharistic notion.  Let  us assume here that what he actually meant was ‘consubstanti-
ality’.
4  To base the discussion of amity on a utilitarian idea of interest, or in fact ‘enlightened self-
interest’ (Tocqueville 2000[1835]), is problematic.  We will not go into the discussion of these 
complex notions, as the work of Adam Smith, Alexis de Tocqueville, Thomas Hobbes, John Stu-
art  Mill and many more testify, but  rather concentrate on the relationship between amity and 
kinship as such.
5  These aspects of Western Desert  ethnography have been discussed in depth in another publica-
tion (Dousset, 2012) and I will only recall here the most important considerations.
6  But note that  the Kurnai of New South Wales described among others in Fison and Howitt 
(1991[1880]) have, in many respects, a similar system.
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